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Words are the first material of scholarship, the most common material that scholars work with, yet it is difficult to see them as participants 
in this project, with a force and productivity of their own. In their daily 
and pragmatic guise as ‘denotative signs,’ a diverse range of relations with 
words, often bodily and affective, are ignored, overlooked or neglected. 
Indeed for all that the air is thick with words (Katamba 2005, 3), we mostly 
do not think of words at all. 
Rather than conceive of words as primarily instrumental, this book asks 
instead after the sound, feel, touch, taste, place, position, speed and direc-
tion of words and how this matters in their uses. Usually, it is literary writ-
ers, who are attentive to the work and play of words, and artists, who are 
attentive to materials, who best capture the sensuous and somatic aspects 
of words. The writer Eudora Welty’s ‘love for the alphabet’ precedes her 
being able to read the letters (Welty 1984, 9). And: ‘[i]n my sensory educa-
tion I include my physical awareness of the word. . . . The word “moon” 
came into my mouth as though fed to me out of a silver spoon. Held in my 
mouth the moon became a word’ (Welty 1984, 10). But as this book illus-
trates, literary writers and artists do not have a monopoly on evocative and 
provocative word encounters. 
Word begins from the premise that while words are ubiquitous, rela-
tions with words are mostly rather narrowly defined. Commonly, and not 
unjustifiably, words are understood in relation to language where their 
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significance derives from their role as arbitrary points or marks in a sys-
tem. As such, words signify conceptually, syntactically and phonetically 
(Harkness 1983, 5). Their histories are the histories of letters and alphabets 
(Sacks 2003). Their connections are established largely with reference to 
other words in strings of verbal meaning.1 On occasion, words are con-
ceived of as images (which may be immaterial, or may be actually drawn). 
This book is an invitation to extend these apprehensions and, in particular, 
to cultivate relations with words that do not travel first through language 
and discourse. The implications of these ‘alternative’ word-relations may 
be political (see especially chapter 3), sensual (see especially chapter 4) or 
methodological (see especially chapter 5). They may be epistemological 
(chapter 1) or experiential (chapter 2). Importantly, it is not the intention 
of Word to extract words from structuralist semiologies only to send them 
back to the European Renaissance, to their role as a ‘final index of the 
Real,’ or to their Romantic incarnation as mystical substance (Harkness 
1983, 7). Instead, this book seeks to explore what is done and undone when 
words are released from word-word associations and enter into multidi-
mensional collaborations with other sorts of creatures. It is a supplication, 
of sorts, to recognize and remember those nonlinguistic word-relations 
that already exist, and to bring new word-relations into being. It asks after 
the kinds of relations that are possible with words, today and in the recent 
past, and the kinds that are forbidden. Word does not dispute the contem-
porary conception and uses of words as components of conscious thought 
and knowledge; it proposes, however, that they are also participants in 
assemblages that are complexly nondiscursive, and that these aspects are 
undoubtedly connected. 
In short, and in common with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this 
book does not assume that the value or efficacy of words is confined to 
purely linguistic and conceptual systems of differences. The relations be-
tween words and language are important, as I will illustrate, but language 
is not the only route through which words acquire meaning and relevance. 
It is for this reason that Word seeks to make sprightly leaps in and across 
the fields not only of language (briefly), but also science, religion, print, ty-
pography and digital technologies, sense, sensation and embodiment (able 
and disabled), art and performance. It does so without attempting to be 
1. Or at least, they are in the Greco-Roman tradition where, as Marc Baratin et al. 
explain, ‘this unit was constituted for its speakers in a way that was not independent 
of the process of the formation of its grammar’ (Baratin et al. 2014, 1243). See the 
philosophical dictionary entry of Baratin et al. for an illuminating account of conceptions 
of the word ‘word’ in European languages (and especially in Greek, Latin and French).
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exhaustive, or comprehensive, and without holding to any single theoretical 
framework. Word mobilises a range of diverse vocabularies most of which 
find shelter under terms such as word-worlds, word-kinds, word-relations 
and word-assemblages.2 These are roomy definitions.
From a theoretical point of view, Word can be said to have developed 
out of a suspicion, shared with Gilles Deleuze, of the ‘cult of language’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 34), and of the obediences that ‘order-words’ 
compel from life, thought and bodies (Deleuze and Guattari 2005). But its 
evolution is perhaps more profoundly connected to two of my own personal 
experiences of relations with words, one of which has been life-long, the 
other of which is recent. With regards to the former: it is that I come from 
two languages, English and Farsi, and I come from them differently. To 
live inside more than one language is anyway to have some insight into the 
wild and often hallucinatory uniquenesses that language-worlds deliver. 
But unlike Ariel Dorfman’s experiences of English and Spanish, I would 
not describe myself as a ‘multiple, complex, in-between person,’ nor am 
I ‘shared by two equal languages’ (Dorfman 1998, 42). Better to say that 
I am linguistically lopsided, with an aggravating knowledge of Farsi that 
comes and goes according to the company it is keeping. Of a Farsi that 
bubbles up and flows along when I am in motion—literally, in transition—
on aeroplanes and buses, in trains and in taxis, on the metro with strangers 
in Iran. And of a Farsi that dries up all too quickly, with friends and fam-
ily, especially if, like me, they speak the language of ‘the enemies . . . “the 
Great Satan,” and its closest ally, the United Kingdom’ (Borjian 2013, xiii). 
It is painful to be locked out of the fullness of a language, and especially 
one as deeply resonant as Farsi. But if one has to be thus excluded, as I am 
(for reasons to do with family, history, biography, ability, as well as a touch 
of taqqieh), then Farsi is at least a language that in its generosity allows 
for many points of nonlinguistic and nondiscursive entry. Words, in Iran, 
furbish walls and buildings in nearly every town, city and village. Sonorous 
speech is the texture of everyday life; in poems, for example, that are daily 
read on the radio, or in the coffeehouse fables of naghāl narrators, or in 
the diversity of theatrical genres, ancient and modern, that come to life on 
streets and in theatres (or that are more recently hidden away from them). 
Statues and national monuments venerate the lives of writers and poets, and 
I have not even arrived yet at the sound of the azãn (see chapter 3 for more 
on the call to prayer). This is how, over time, I have come to build my own 
connections with Farsi in some secret and precious ways and places that are 
2. When I write of words ‘in and of themselves,’ I will use inverted commas, for it is not 
words per se but rather word-assemblages to which I am referring.
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hidden from the harsh glare of language and my failures. It is how I have 
become attentive to ‘alternative’ connections with words more generally. 
And now a new relation with words emerges, a personal relation that is 
more recent, and that could be described as acute rather than chronic, when 
a close friend, Colette, was diagnosed with upper motor neurone disease 
(MND) in September 2013. ‘The salient quality of this particular neurode-
generative disorder,’ the historian Tony Judt wrote of his own experience, 
‘is that it leaves your mind clear to reflect on past, present, and future, but 
steadily deprives you of any means of converting those reflections into 
words’ (Judt 2011, 4). This is one of things that MND seems to me to 
steal—words, rather than language. Words, in their material, sensory and 
sensual independence. Today, Colette types her words into a tablet and then 
plays them back in a voice of her choice, in the wry smack of an Australian 
called Alan who says the most outrageous things that Colette would never 
get away with (not in her ‘own’ voice, she wouldn’t). As I try to travel with 
her, in the limited ways I am able, I learn through their disappearance how 
words are made meaningful through embodied relations. I learn that, as in 
language, some words need to be exchanged in the very same substance. 
Which is why I too pick up the tablet, so that I too can speak in Alan. But 
once the speech-machine is in my hands my index finger hovers, a head-
hanging dullard, this stupefying hesitation, until finally I am reminded that 
I am holding Colette’s voice captive, in my possession, and that I now have 
two voices at my command, while she, my friend, has none. 
This introduction begins by raising three issues that are relevant to Word. 
Somewhat counterintuitively, these issues are important because they will 
not be explored as discrete topics in the book that follows. Instead, they can 
be understood as thematic forces that emerge again and again under differ-
ent circumstances and in different guises. It is this combination, of being 
significant but nevertheless implicit, a kind of invisible stitching, which 
leads me to foreground them here. The first concerns words and images, or 
words as images, for this is one of the more obvious ways in which words 
are (potentially) dispossessed of their relations to language and discourse. 
The second refers to language, and how it is conceived of, for while this 
book does not for the most part address itself to linguistic word-world rela-
tions, it is nevertheless useful to have a touchstone for how I understand 
them. The third pertains to nonconscious cognition, for if Word is at all 
successful in dislodging words from their place in language—at least a 
little, or on occasion—then it necessarily raises the question of ‘other’ 
modes of thinking and knowing. Having addressed these three themes, I 
will introduce in the final two parts of this chapter my own methodological 
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orientation to words, which I have borrowed from the historian Caroline 
Walker Bynum’s (1997) work on wonder, and the structure and content of 
the book, chapter by chapter.
WORDS AND IMAGES
In the fifteenth century, Mir Ali al-Tabrizi dreamed of flying geese. After-
wards, he perfected a calligraphic style called nasta’liq, which is known 
as the ‘hanging script’ (Porter 2006, 20). al-Tabrizi’s dream suggests to 
me that his words are part of bird-worlds, or that they are bird-words, but 
the legend that accompanies an example of the script (see figure 1) seems 
blithely to assume that if these words are of birds at all, then this is only on 
account of their being bird-like. Which is to say: these words are like birds 
when words are like images.3 
To say that the word parandeh, which means ‘bird’ in Farsi, is bird-like 
when it is written in the nasta’liq script is to treat it as something to look at 
rather than as something to read. It is to put aside or to temporarily suspend 
the symbolic dimension of the word (that conventional aspect of the sign 
that pertains to discursive meaning) and to look at parandeh much as one 
might look at a picture of a bird by an artist. Parandeh, when it is written 
or painted or carved or printed in elegant script, turns—to quote from the 
3. By which I mean, in this instance, like graphic images. As Martin Jay notes however, 
the word ‘image’ is ambivalent and ‘can signify graphic, optical, perceptual, mental, or 
verbal phenomena’ (Jay 1994, 9). This ambivalence is revealing, Jay continues, of ‘a 
close, if complicated, relationship between sight and language’ (Jay 1994, 8). I return to 
the relations between vision and words in chapter 2.
Figure 1. Schimmel 1990, 29
Schimmel, Annemarie, Calligraphy and Islamic Culture, I.B.Tauris, 1990, 29
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title of an exhibition of calligraphy from the Middle East—Word into Art 
(Porter 2006). All words written in the nasta’liq script, to the extent that 
they look like birds, flutter close to the image. 
In this section of the introduction I outline some of the issues that are 
raised by the perception of words as images. My remarks will be inten-
tionally general because I am exploring words and their visual dimension 
throughout this book and especially in chapters 2 and 4. In view of the 
detail that is to follow, I begin here with ‘a commonplace,’ as Jay David 
Bolter puts it, which is ‘that we are living in an age dominated by visual 
representation’ and that, as such, ‘the balance between [the] verbal and 
[the] visual’ has shifted (Bolter 2005, 19; cf. chapter 2, this book). This 
means not simply that visual representation dominates over verbal, but 
that the word itself is ‘revealed’ to be an image: ‘[t]he word is an image 
after all’ (Moulthrop in Kirschenbaum 2005, 137). Or perhaps one might 
say, less theatrically, that in this ‘postalphabetic era,’ ‘the boundaries be-
tween word and image have never been more permeable’ (Kirschenbaum 
2005, 137).
The typographic manifestos of the futurists and the dadaists, Jay Bolter 
and Matthew Kirschenbaum argue, and the graphic designers associated 
with Bauhaus and De Stijl, laid some of the groundwork for ‘this broad-
band cultural shift to the visible spectrums of language’ (Kirschenbaum 
2005, 137). In the later part of the twentieth century, this shift was lent 
new intensity by desktop publishing and especially the arrival of the Apple 
Macintosh in 1984 which contributed in the 1990s to ‘the “deconstructive” 
graphic design of Neville Brody, David Carson, and their cohorts—before 
Wired (and countless Madison Avenue imitators) domesticated its grunge 
aesthetics for the new .com economy’ (Kirschenbaum 2005, 137). The 
emphasis on the visual dimensions of words can also be situated, Kirschen-
baum continues, in the context of the increasing number and variety of 
visual artefacts and methodologies that have been enfolded into academic 
and especially ‘mainstream “textual” scholarship’ (Kirschenbaum 2005, 
138). This phenomenon is in part a consequence of the consolidation of 
those domains that inhabit the borders between the visual and verbal arts, of 
the ascendency of cultural studies, of new historicism, and of the establish-
ment of new media and digital culture as legitimate subjects of academic 
enquiry. ‘I myself wouldn’t have it any other way’ (Kirschenbaum 2005, 
138), Kirschenbaum finishes.
One might imagine that, in view of Word’s intention to put words into 
as many diverse relations as is possible, this intensification of the visual 
aspect of the written word would be welcomed. Graphic designers, Bolter 
writes, make ‘the word immediate and sensually apprehensible by insisting 
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on its visual form rather than its symbolic significance’ (Bolter 2005, 19). 
It is not the case, however, that ‘the word as image’ inevitably or neces-
sarily releases it from the logic of language. In his introduction to Michel 
Foucault’s This Is Not a Pipe, James Harkness suggests that, through 
 resemblance, there creeps into painting, which is ‘in theory an exclusively 
visual production,’ a ‘secret, inescapably linguistic element: “This painted 
image is that thing”’ (Harkness 1983, 8, emphasis in the original). It is 
precisely in this way, by way of its resemblance to birds, by way of its 
being bird-like, that the word parandeh in the nasta’liq script remains tied 
to the ‘burden of discourse’ (Harkness 1983, 8). Indeed one might say that 
the word flies straight into the cage of the sign for now the image—the 
word ‘bird,’ written in a birdy script—and the object it signifies coincide. 
Parandeh, in nasta’liq script, is a rare example of a written word that is 
also iconic.4 Or that hovers provocatively between two types of writing, the 
pictorial (in which a thing is designated by a drawing) and the alphabetic 
(in which the sounds of words are analysed and reconstituted). Or perhaps 
it is calligramic, as well as calligraphic.
As well as the question of the relation of the word-as-image to ‘the 
world’ (which may remain stubbornly denotative), there is in addition the 
problematic and partly empirical issue as to how or when a shift from ‘word 
to image,’ or, more broadly, from ‘word culture to image culture’ might 
be established. I will be drawing on Elizabeth Eisenstein’s ([1979] 2009) 
epic study The Printing Press as an Agent of Change to suggest in chapter 
2 that even the first of these so-called transformations, the transformation 
from ‘image culture’ to ‘word culture’ that was ostensibly delivered by the 
invention of printing in the fifteenth century, has yet to be settled. Thus 
while many theorists accept the truism that contemporary new media have 
inaugurated a form of image culture that is historically unmatched (see Rot-
man’s [2008] justification of this kind of claim in his chapter 4), there are 
also plenty of reasons to be wary about too hastily identifying a ‘paradigm 
shift.’ In chapter 2, my focus lies on how even the very definition of a word 
and an image can be differently constituted by changing relations between 
words and senses.
Which brings me to a related point. Although I opened this section with 
a discussion of several of Kirschenbaum’s claims regarding the ubiquity 
of words-as-images, his purpose is in fact to slow this story down, particu-
larly with regard to computing where, he states, ‘images remain largely 
opaque in the algorithmic eyes of the machine’ (Kirschenbaum 2005, 139). 
4. This is unusual, because verbal icons are more commonly associated with spoken 
words, like ‘cuckoo,’ because they are onomatopoeic.
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Kirschenbaum’s argument is that, despite numerous declarations regarding 
the fluidity of the boundaries between text and image, ‘it is . . . precisely 
the data’s unequivocal computational status as text that permits the soft-
ware to produce . . . remarkable visual displays’ (Kirschenbaum 2005, 
149, emphasis in the original). The broader and more relevant issue that 
Kirschenbaum is raising here—that is shared by Word, and that does not 
turn on the resolution or not of this particular computing problem—is that 
‘one cannot talk about words as images and images as words without tak-
ing into account the technologies of representation upon which both forms 
depend’ (Kirschenbaum 2005, 141). This is a crucial point, one that is not 
confined solely to technologies of representation (although this is a signifi-
cant part of it) but can rather be extended to the very many elements and 
relations that constitute a word as an image, or not, in its spatio-temporal 
specificity. It is for this reason, on account of a word’s contingency, that 
I will use Gottfried Semper’s theory of matter in chapter 4 to argue that a 
visual word is better understood not as a ‘petrified image’ (which implies 
an unchanging entity) but rather as a ‘structurally stable embellishment’ 
(Spuybroek 2011, 94)—which is to say, a temporary outcome of a process.
I want to briefly illustrate this point about specificity and contingency by 
highlighting how difficult it can be to define what kind of a sign a word is 
in advance.5 In Iconology (1986), W. J. T. Mitchell suggests that, if the ‘war 
of signs’ between poetry and painting has been especially tenacious,6 then 
this is in part because the differences between them appear to be so funda-
mental. ‘Each art,’ Mitchell writes, ‘lays claim to certain things that it is 
best equipped to mediate, and each grounds its claim in a certain character-
ization of its “self,” its own proper essence. . . . poetry, or verbal expression 
in general, sees its signs as arbitrary and conventional—that is, “unnatural” 
in contrast to the natural signs of imagery’ (Mitchell 1986, 47). Thus it is, 
Mitchell continues, that most semiologists will identify signs on the basis 
of their ‘appeal to a “share of convention” divided with some proportionate 
share of nature’ (Mitchell 1986, 65–66, references and emphases omitted). 
From this perspective, a photochemical photograph7 and a word—to take 
a seemingly exaggerated example—would seem to be almost directly op-
posed, for a word is usually considered to be determined almost entirely by 
5. Which is not to suggest that words are always signs. See my discussion of this below.
6. Mitchell proposes that, since the end of the eighteenth century—a timeline that he 
derives by including ‘everything from the eidophusikon to . . . computers’—this war of 
signs has been cast more neutrally as ‘text versus image’ (Mitchell 1986, 50).
7. This brief discussion, in keeping with the theorists on which it draws, focuses on 
photochemical rather than digital photography.
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convention, while a photograph shares so high a proportion of nature that 
it can be explained with reference to ‘the real.’ Rosalind Krauss writes: 
photography is an imprint or transfer off the real; it is a photochemically 
processed trace causally connected to that thing in the world to which it refers 
in a manner parallel to that of fingerprints or footprints or the rings of water 
that cold glasses leave on tables. The photograph is thus generically distinct 
from painting or sculpture or drawing. On the family tree of images it is closer 
to palm prints, death masks, the Shroud of Turin, or the tracks of gulls on 
beaches. For technically and semiologically speaking, drawings and paintings 
are icons, while photographs are indexes. (Krauss 1999, 110)8 
Or as John Berger puts it in his distinctively quiet style, ‘the primary raw 
materials’ of a photograph ‘are light and time’ (Berger 2013, 61). 
Although this carving up of signs along the axis of nature/motivation 
and convention/arbitrariness might seem intuitively ‘right,’ it is neverthe-
less itself convention, specific to a world-view in which ‘the real,’ as 
Krauss puts it, is conflated with the physical, and is available for explana-
tion by the natural sciences. It is only within this particular matrix that 
a photograph appears to be of the world, while a word is distant from it. 
In striking contrast, I will be exploring in chapter 3 how words too can 
be a ‘sample’ of the world—a sample of the world divine. Chapter 3 is 
an extensive engagement with the implications for words of the divinity 
of the Qur’an. Suffice it to note here that, when compared to the Godly 
motivation of the Qur’anic text, photography, shaped as it is by histories 
of human inventions and conventions, could be said to be almost wholly 
arbitrary. It is on account of this relation to divinity that the Qur’an, like 
the photograph in other circumstances, seems neither to be mediated by, 
nor to require, interpretation. Indeed some might say of the Qur’an, as 
Roland Barthes does of a photograph, that it is a ‘message without a code’ 
(Barthes in Mitchell 1986, 60).
The final point I want to make with regard to words and images is 
that the debate about their relation does not have to be tied inescapably 
to whether a word is an image (or not), or which is what, and so on. In 
chapter 4, for instance, I explore how the problems that John Berger iden-
tifies with and for the photographic image have much in common with 
the problems with and for words when their meaning is not understood 
to derive primarily from language. These problems concern, principally, 
continuity and discontinuity, arbitrariness and deadness, linearity, memory 
8. Although note that Charles Peirce considered photographs to be a composite of iconic 
and indexical signs (Mitchell 1986, 59–60).
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and experience. It is not my aim in chapter 4 to suggest that words are like 
photographs or, more broadly, that words are like images. I will not even 
be suggesting that words might, on occasion, act like photographs or im-
ages. Instead, the chapter addresses the conceptual similarities and differ-
ences, with respect to meaning, that are raised by single photographs (and 
single photographs in sequence) and by words that have been ‘extracted’ 
from language. 
Mary E. Hocks and Michelle R. Kendrick, in their introduction to Elo-
quent Images: Word and Image in the Age of New Media, suggest that 
[t]he persistent distinctions historically between ‘visual culture’ and ‘print 
culture’ are symptomatic of what sociologist Bruno Latour calls modernist 
thinking: the binary-based thinking that posits radical paradigm shifts from 
one communications medium to another or from one form of writing technol-
ogy to another. Latour thus gives us an insight into the history behind the 
persistent narrative of the binary, explored here as word/image. (Hocks and 
Kendrick 2005, 3)
In this section I have offered a number of different reasons as to why it 
would be problematic to endorse—or at least, to endorse in advance—the 
distinctions between words and images (as well as the distinctions between 
‘word cultures’ and ‘image cultures’). I have suggested that these distinc-
tions may not hold for conceptual and/or empirical reasons, and that they 
have a tendency to close down the potential inventiveness of analysis by 
confining it to an interrogation of what words and images ‘are.’ For me, 
the value of Latour’s thesis—which distinguishes between the work of ‘pu-
rification,’ on the one hand, (the work that seeks to differentiate between 
ontological zones) and hybridity on the other (the endless entanglement of 
diverse elements)—lies not in its potential support for the notion that words 
are hybrids, but in its ability to explain the often jarring divergences be-
tween the theories, histories, philosophies that are told for and about words, 
and empirical experiences of them. I purposely exploit this tension in chap-
ter 1, where it structures the narrative, and it remains an issue throughout 
this book. To return to my opening vignette, for instance: although Foucault 
would argue that the shape of a calligram will inevitably dissipate in favour 
of ‘the linear, successive unfurling of meaning’—thus illustrating that ‘the 
calligram does not say, cannot yet say: This is a flower, this is a bird’ 
(Foucault 1983, 24, emphasis in the original)—the claim is surely more 
complicated if one considers the specificity of the image and of whether 
the reader-spectator can or cannot understand the language. For while, to 
a non-Farsi speaker, the word parandeh is pictured as a static tableau, to 
the person who sees in Farsi, the meaning of the word ‘unfurls’ with the 
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flying, with the flight of the bird. Parandeh, written in the nasta’liq script 
and read by a Farsi speaker, is a word and an image together, both, in their 
immediacy, a word and an image in motion.9 
Attention to images (for example to words-as-images) is often consid-
ered to be part of the reason why many new media theorists are disposed 
towards Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s ‘machinic semiotics.’ This is 
because, Janell Watson writes, it ‘focuses less on language and symbols 
than on image, data, sensation, movement, subjectivity, and global politi-
cal economics. Like the interactive networks of new media, this machinic 
semiotics brings together a diverse array of elements operating at many 
registers and affecting multiple senses, often below the level of conscious 
cognition’ (Watson 2010, 245). Although I am sympathetic to the Deleuze 
and Guattari/new media alliance, the problem with this view, for me, is that 
it often assumes both that ‘old’ and new media forms are constitutively dif-
ferent, and, further, that this difference is or should be reflected in the tools 
with which they are analysed. Ganaele Langlois makes the case directly: 
‘[a] text in its conventional understanding consists of a set of meanings 
expressed through signs, be they visual, written, audio, etc. Traditionally, 
text-focused methodologies deal with content in its linguistic and social 
aspects rather than with the technological or material context that enables 
the production and circulation of signs’ (Langlois 2011, 9). 
Words, however, are ‘produced and circulate’ (as signs perhaps, or 
maybe not) on both sides of this perceived divide and, as such, they scratch 
at some of Langlois’s assumptions. While almost unavoidably linguistic, 
they are also nearly always material (chapter 2), political (chapter 3), and 
sometimes better understood as sensation, gesture and movement (chapters 
4 and 5). These characteristics suggest that the relevance of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s machinic semiotics cannot be determined by the media-form to 
which it is ‘applied.’ From the perspective of Word, the very opposition 
between ‘conventionally understood text + analysis of the linguistic and 
social’ and ‘new and digital media forms + analysis of technocultural as-
semblage’ looks like a kind of discrimination that is designed to keep words 
in their place. It is with a mind to enabling words to step out of place (and 
9. Such questions, which concern empirical conditions, would of course be a distraction 
for Foucault who is more fundamentally proposing that ‘what we can see’ and ‘what 
we can say’ are irreducible to one another and divided (Deleuze 1992). This gap (or 
at best the interplay) between seeing and saying is a defining feature of Foucault’s 
epistemology. ‘[I]t is no exaggeration’ Mitchell writes, ‘to say that the little essay on 
Magritte, and the hypericon of “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” provides a picture of Foucault’s 
way of writing and his whole theory of the stratification of knowledge and the relations 
of power in the dialectic of the visible and the sayable’ (Mitchell 1994, 71).
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especially out of language) that, in the following section, I briefly outline 
why Maurizio Lazzarato’s Guattarian understanding of ‘signs and ma-
chines’ is a fitting scrim for this book.
LANGUAGE. OR RATHER, ‘EXIT LANGUAGE.’10
Unlike the themes of words and images, and of nonconscious cognition 
(see below)—which I am discussing in this introduction because they 
inform the analysis that follows in Word, but are not developed directly 
therein—I do address language, as a topic in itself, in this book. In chapter 
1, I explore how different conceptions of the operations of language, as 
they are understood in a focused number of histories, impact on words. 
With this exception however, Word is for the most part not an engagement 
with words in language, nor does it seek to make any contribution to lin-
guistic theory. It does not assume, for example, that words necessarily (or 
exclusively, rather) function as signs in language, or even that they inevita-
bly function as signs at all. In keeping with Deleuze and Guattari’s critique 
of ‘the modern idea of signification,’ this book, taken as a whole, implicitly 
contests the notion that all sign-systems are overcoded by language and/or 
that there is any ‘system of relations that determines life in advance’ (Cole-
brook 2010, 252). Whether a word is a sign, what kind of sign it is if it is, 
and what kinds of relations it might enter into, is an open question. It is an 
open question for this book, but one that is largely of interest only because, 
on a day-to-day basis, words are routinely understood to serve as ‘no more’ 
than near-transparent delivery vehicles for meanings that originate or are 
generated elsewhere (see also my discussion of words-as-inscriptions in 
chapter 2). Maurizio Lazzarato’s account of signifying semiologies pro-
vides one explanation as to how it is that words and word-relations could 
come to be so diminished. This is the first of three contributions, which I 
will introduce here, that his analysis of signs and machines makes to Word.
In Signs and Machines Lazzarato (2014), drawing on Félix Guattari, 
identifies three semiotic systems, or ‘sign machines.’ These are: ‘natural’ 
a-semiotic encodings, like genetic codes (which this book does not discuss 
at all); semiologies of signification, which include both signifying and 
a-signifying semiologies (which is the focus of most of this section); and 
symbolic semiologies (which I introduce only briefly towards its end). Al-
though none of these machines are defined on the basis of, or with reference 
10. Guattari in Lazzarato 2010, 507.
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to, human language (see below), one of them in particular, signifying se-
miologies, certainly feels as if it should be, for its organization in terms 
of ‘reference/denotation, signification, representation’ (Lazzarato 2010, 
509) carries with it an all-too-human familiarity and common-senseness: 
signs refer to, denote or represent things in the world. And yet all of these 
functions, as Lazzarato understands them, constrain and circumscribe sig-
nification. Denotation, for example, ‘sets up a bi-univocal relation between 
the sign and the designated thing’ such that this denotes that and nothing 
further, while reference and representation (to which I will return below) 
tether ‘the sign to its referent’ and in this way authorise a ‘dominant real-
ity’ rather than floating and uncertain multidimensionality (Lazarrato 2010, 
509). It is in these kinds of ways that significations become ‘“automatic” 
and . . . stable’ (Lazarrato 2010, 509). And it is for these kinds of reasons 
that this signifying semiology, Lazzarato writes, should be understood for 
what it is: a ‘veritable war machine’ (Lazzarato 2010, 509).
To what end do signifying semiologies drain and impoverish (Lazzarato 
2010, 509) words and their worlds? One reason for foregrounding the 
nonhuman dimension of these sign machines is that it allows Lazzarato to 
explore how semiologies of signification and a-signification (to which I 
return in a moment) are structured by and service the needs of capitalism. 
For capitalism, in order to function effectively, requires ‘translatability, 
equivalence, comparability’ (Lazzarato 2010, 508). The purpose of the sig-
nifying sign machine therefore—the machine that ‘structures, polices, and 
clamps down significations’—is to reduce heterogeneity, ‘multivalence 
and mutlireferentiality’ (Lazzarato 2010, 509). ‘In contemporary capital-
ism’ Lazzarato writes, ‘this semiotic politics is at work on individuals from 
birth. Semiotic initiation is the earliest “labor,” prior to any other’ (Laz-
zarato 2010, 508). Children are initiated, for instance, not only into their 
‘mother tongue’ but also into ‘codes of getting around the street, a certain 
complex relation to machines, to electricity, and so on’ (Guattari in Laz-
zarato 2010, 508). 
Two further aspects of this machinic semiotics—its treatment of rep-
resentation and subjectivity—implicitly inform the analysis of words in 
this book. To take the issue of representation first: the problem with rep-
resentation, as Lazzarato explains it, is that it ‘divides up the world into a 
mental world or symbolic world (a world of images, representative icons, 
and symbols) and a “denoted real”’ (Lazzarato 2010, 510). This division 
is deleterious because it distinguishes signs (which are the object of Laz-
zarato’s analysis) and words (which are the object of mine) from the real 
and thus from their ability to act ‘on’ it. ‘[R]epresentation,’ Lazzarato con-
tinues, ‘makes signs “impotent” because they do not work pragmatically 
xxii Introduction
upon the “real,” they do not transform it directly. They require the media-
tion of consciousness and representation and the subject’ (Lazzarato 2010, 
510). Although I do not use Lazzarato’s theoretical vocabulary in chapter 
1, the analysis therein could nevertheless be understood in terms of an in-
vestigation into the implications (for words) of the different and changing 
configurations of elements that Lazzarato considers to be central to this 
signifying semiology: word-signs, ‘the real,’ representation, consciousness, 
and subject/subjectivity. 
Importantly however, for Lazzarato, this collection of elements is not to 
be taken as natural or given. On the contrary, in order to understand how 
capitalism functions as a ‘semiotic operator’ (Lazzarato 2010, 509), it is 
necessary to detach subjectivity from the human, and language from hu-
man subjectivity. Or to put that conversely, to confer a-subjectivity (a-‘for-
itself’) and the power of enunciation onto living and material assemblages. 
Human subjectivity does not, according to Lazzarato, have ‘an existential 
status of exception’ (Guattari in Lazzarato 2010, 506) and autopoietic 
power, which is ‘the power of self-production that immanently secretes 
its own rules and modalities of expression,’ can be extended to machines 
(Lazzarato 2010, 506).11 This is the third important aspect of Lazzarato’s 
conception of semiotics for Word, for it opens the door to an analysis that 
asks not what words subjects use, but in what word-assemblages (which 
are diverse in their composition) subjects are produced or even extracted. 
Investigating the words that subjects ‘choose’ (consciously or not) is an ur-
gent project, but it is beyond the scope of this book, which focuses on non-
linguistic relations with words. This is not to suggest, however, that such 
relations do not also have a bearing on power and politics. For instance: al-
though this book does not address ‘hate speech,’ it examines how different 
word-relations can create grounds for hate (see, for example, chapter 3) and 
how they can engender discrimination and prejudice (chapter 4). The point, 
for now, is that subjects and their capacities are defined and to some degree 
determined by the assemblages—in this book, the word-assemblages—in 
which they are situated. To give a parallel example, taken from Tiziana 
Terranova’s analysis of Lazzarato (on debt and autonomy), one does not 
so much use a smart phone, a search engine or a social network, but rather 
becomes part of its constitution—‘under the direction and management of 
11. ‘Machine,’ in Lazzarato’s Guattari-inflected vision, does not refer to a tool or 
technology that extends a pregiven subject or living being. Instead, living beings, 
along with multiplicities of other components, together constitute assemblages that are 
not only technical in nature, but also, as Lazzarato would have it, ‘scientific, social, 
theoretical, economic, aesthetic, immaterial, and so forth’ (Lazzarato 2010, 505).
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the corporation who “own” the operating system, the algorithm or the serv-
ers and has the control of the proprietary technology’ (Terranova 2014). 
Although Terranova is referring to corporations, the point arguably applies 
as readily to the philosophy-, language- and religion-machines that seek, 
with more or less success, to direct, manage and delimit words and word-
encounters (see chapter 1, this book). 
Lazzarato’s conception of machines as sites of enunciation inevitably 
gives rise to a critique of theories of language which are organized around 
human subjectivity, even if that subjectivity is understood to be an effect of 
the performativity of language. This is because, for Lazzarato, it is not and 
cannot be language which ‘acts,’ for language, as I have already noted, is 
locked within a semiotic triangle that dispossesses the sign of the capacity 
to intervene in the real. It is not language which produces effects, Laz-
zarato argues, but micro-political power relations (which are productive 
language). ‘Language’s power to act,’ he writes, ‘as exercised in the Greek 
polis and an assumption still implicit in all these theories since Hannah Ar-
endt, is no longer sufficient to describe the “political word.” In the contem-
porary public arena, the production of the word is organized “industrially” 
rather than “theatrically”’ (Lazzarato 2006).12 ‘Capitalism,’ as Deleuze and 
Guattari put it, ‘is profoundly illiterate’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 240). 
The unsatisfactory politics of discourse, narrative and signification is evi-
dent in the way that it reduces power ‘to an icon, an image, a representation 
for contemplation (about which, in reality, we are rarely fooled)’ (Laz-
zarato 2014, 123), while all the time a-signifying semiotics course through 
the veins of bodies, ‘partial and modular subjectivities,’ and ‘non-reflexive 
consciousness’ (Lazarrato 2014, 89). A-signifying semiotics or a-signi-
fying signs—‘signs of power,’ ‘power signs,’ or ‘sign-points’ (Lazzarato 
2010, 513)—are distinguished from signifying signs because they are not 
mediated by consciousness, representation or by a subject. Instead, ‘[a] 
relation of a new kind is established between sign and referent,’ Lazzarato 
writes, in which signs ‘do not represent or refer to an already constituted 
“dominant” reality. Rather, they simulate and pre-produce a reality that is 
not yet there, that is there only virtually’ (Lazzarato 2010, 513).13
12. Thus it is no longer the cultural and intellectual elites in law, literature, education 
and religion that unify society, but rather the ‘“signage” language’ of industry and 
technocracy and ‘private enterprises’ (Lazzarato 2010, 505–06, references omitted). It 
was Pier Paolo Pasolini, Lazzarato writes, who first recognized that the transition from 
capitalism to neocapitalism coincided with a transformation of language (for more on 
Pasolini, see Lazaratto 2014, chapter 3).
13. To be clear: where signifying semiologies contribute to social subjection (by 
manufacturing individuated subjects and identities for example), a-signifying semiologies 
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Lazzarato’s analysis begins to illustrate how words can come to be am-
bushed, trapped and kidnapped inside the narrow and restricted confines of 
the sign machines that organize language. As well as analysing signifying 
and a-signifying sign machines, Lazzarato also discusses the symbolic 
semiologies that precede capitalism (but which can be identified within 
capitalism, in some pockets, such as in love or passion). These symbolic 
semiologies are ‘pre-capitalistic’ insofar as their translatability or equiva-
lence is not ‘accomplished through a formalization of the expression (the 
signifier) that seizes power over the semiotic systems’ but, rather, ‘by a 
social assemblage’ (Lazarrato 2010, 508). A social assemblage, Lazzarato 
continues, ‘wards off the manifestation of a single signifying substance, of 
a signifying synthesis, of a system that hierarchizes and subordinates other 
modalities of expression’ (Lazzarato 2010, 508).14 An example of a single 
signifying substance would be a structuralist conception of language. 
If I were to ‘choose’ a semiology for words,15 then the polyvocality and 
multidimensionality of symbolic semiologies would certainly be intuitively 
appealing to me, and conducive to the tenor of this book. Such a semiology 
would have to be specifically defined, however, in Lazzarato’s terms and 
not in terms of the word-relations that characterize archaic medievalism or 
the ‘age of resemblance’ as Foucault conceives of it (see chapter 1). These 
are, in my view, too tightly bound up with ‘Western’ narratives about 
religion, science, and Enlightenment to make them either politically or 
empirically persuasive. I critique that narrative, on both these grounds, ex-
plicitly in chapters 1 and 2 and implicitly throughout the rest of this book. 
The reason that I feel compelled to distance myself from such esoteric word 
relations here however—and to draw attention to my critique of them—is 
because I have been surprised how often, during the course of writing 
Word, words in medieval worlds have made an appearance. It is also be-
cause, to my even greater surprise, I find that my own ‘heart-relation’ with 
dismantle the individuated subject in the service of ‘machinic enslavement.’ These two 
semiotic modes mostly, however, operate together: ‘signifying semiotics effectuate a 
molar processing of subjectivity that targets, solicits, and interpellates consciousness, 
representation, and the individuated subject, whereas asignifying semiotics effectuate a 
molecular processing of the same subjectivity, mobilizing partial subjectivities, states of 
non-reflexive consciousness, perceptual systems, and so on’ (Lazzarato 2014, 124).
14. Although Lazzarato identifies ‘the tribe’ and ‘the community’ as examples of 
social assemblages, I would prefer to define them in terms of their operations (their 
nonsynthesizing modalities of becoming and endurance, as described above), rather than 
by their content.
15. ‘If’ is an important qualifier here because, as I noted earlier, words do not have to 
be conceived of in terms of signs and semiologies.
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words is best defined by what the historian Caroline Walker Bynum de-
scribes as a medieval concept of wonder. I examine the key characteristics 
of this concept in the penultimate section of this chapter—after, that is, I 
have addressed the third and final issue that runs like a seam through Word, 
which is that of nonconscious cognition. 
CONSCIOUS AND NONCONSCIOUS  
RELATIONS WITH WORDS
In her profound and moving account of migrants dying, Yasmin Gunarat-
nam explores how the ‘body’s activities can bypass subjectivity, reason and 
knowing’ (Gunaratnam 2013, 55). Importantly, Gunaratnam warns against 
the consolation that such activities are bodies ‘speaking,’ or that ‘the 
body’s lines of flight’ can be transformed into language: ‘the non-verbal is 
precisely not language,’ she writes, quoting Thomas Csordas (Gunaratnam 
2013, 44). What I want to clarify here however, both with regard to my 
understanding of Gunaratnam’s work and my own analysis in this book, is 
that nonverbal modes of living and dying do not necessarily also exclude 
words. It is quite possible, indeed it is likely—and this, in short, is the cen-
tral argument of Word—that, as well as words in language, there are uses 
and experiences of words that are ‘precisely not language’ (my emphasis) 
and that this is so because there are many ways of engaging with words, 
even if they are not always or even often recognized. One of the critical 
propositions of Word is that the implications for words of the numerous 
different challenges to language that have been launched over the last 
three centuries—challenges that I will be documenting in every chapter in 
this book16—cannot be determined by the consequences of such provoca-
tions for language. As the first chapter of this book explicitly illustrates, 
theories and histories of words and language may well be divergent. When 
Gunaratnam shows how bodies live worlds differently to how we speak 
of them, and to how they speak of themselves, she is referring to words in 
language, which usually means words in chain-relations with other words. 
But as she also illustrates, dying brings a diversity of relations with words 
to the fore, which is partly why it obliges ‘care . . . [to] become artful in 
its responsiveness’ (Gunaratnam 2013, 55). The nonlinguistic experience, 
the untranslatable, undecideable, maybe even the unintelligible experience, 
16. Of language as ‘not present’ to itself for example (in chapter 1), as diminished by the 
visuality of writing and especially print (in chapter 2), as incidental to the divinity of the 
Qur’an (chapter 3), as an obstacle to memory and experience (chapter 4), as imminently 
doomed to extinction in favour of gesture (chapter 5).
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is an inspiration not just to learn to be affected therefore (where affect is 
an alternative resource to language), but also to be affected to learn (Gu-
naratnam 2012). In her book, Gunaratnam (2013) demonstrates how ‘the 
unspeakable’ can be turned into a prompt for trying to create new kinds of 
connections, including new kinds of word-connections. Words themselves 
are not enervating, as Gunaratnam, who is not only an academic but also a 
short-story writer and a poem maker, of course knows.
It is not surprising to me that Gunaratnam should find music and dance 
to be more analogous to living and dying than she does ‘the rationalities 
of conscious thought’ (Gunaratnam 2013, 6). The ‘alternative’ (by which 
I mean nonlinguistic) word-relations that I will be exploring in Word have 
the effect of bringing exactly this issue—which might be described as ‘non-
conscious cognition’—to the fore. In chapter 3, for instance, in my analysis 
of some of the implications of the divinity of the Qur’anic text for words 
(and for interfaith relations), I will be drawing on what the anthropologist 
Charles Hirschkind calls ‘hearing with the heart,’ a hearing that ‘bypasses’ 
conscious textual comprehension (Hirschkind 2001, 2006). I further de-
velop this and other theories of listening in chapter 5, where I explore the 
value of a ‘sonic methodology’ that is based not on the discursive dimen-
sions of speech, but rather on the sounds of it. It is on account of this focus 
on ‘un-thinking’ relations with words in this book—and these are only two 
of several examples that will I be discussing—that, as I proposed earlier, it 
is worth pausing for a moment longer on the theme of cognition. 
The term ‘nonconscious cognition’—which I will be deploying very 
loosely—is inspired by N. Katherine Hayles’ article ‘Cognition Every-
where,’ in which Hayles distinguishes between thinking and cognition. 
This is how she describes the difference:
To avoid confusion, I will reserve ‘thinking’ for what conscious entities such 
as humans (and some animals) do, and ‘cognition’ as a broader term that does 
not necessarily require consciousness but has the effect of performing complex 
modeling and other information tasks. On this view, we can say that while all 
thinking is cognition, not all cognition is thinking. In this respect the cognitive 
nonconscious is qualitatively different from the unconscious, which commu-
nicates with consciousness in a number of ways. Accordingly, I will call con-
sciousness/unconsciousness ‘modes of awareness.’ (Hayles 2014, 201) 
For Hayles, cognition serves, in part, as an analytic term for use in the 
explanation of neuropsychological processes.17 For me, it is enabling of a 
17. Hayles goes on to propose, for example, that the reason the cognitive nonconscious 
is distinguished from the unconscious is because it ‘operates at a lower level of neuronal 
organization not accessible to introspection’ (Hayles 2014, 201). 
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rather more general concept, ‘nonconscious cognition,’ which I find to be 
a helpful tool to think with, a tool through which novel word-relations can 
be explored and generated.18 (And indeed I find variations on this term in 
the literature on which I draw throughout this book.) 
It is notable that although Hayles situates her analysis of the cognitive 
nonconscious in the broader context of interpretation in the humanities, 
she explores this topic largely with reference to computational and tech-
nological devices and affordances, and in relation to neuropsychology. In 
chapter 5, I will be interrogating Brian Rotman’s account of nonconscious 
cognition, in Becoming Beside Ourselves (2008), which draws on a similar 
set of resources (especially parallel computing, and evolutionary neurobi-
ology and neuropsychology). Rotman’s position is less qualified than is 
Hayles’: recent developments in these fields, he argues, do not so much 
put the (Western) humanities at a crossroads, as Hayles would have it,19 
but rather promise to entirely obliterate global alphabets (I say ‘promise’ 
for this, for Rotman, is something to be welcomed). One aspect of my 
critique of Rotman—which I mention here because it is also relevant to 
Hayles—is that one does not require recourse to new media, or to high-end 
technologies or even to the neuro-disciplines in order to identify enduring 
examples of nonconscious cognition.20 As I will illustrate in chapter 3, 
‘hearing with the heart’ (to return to my earlier example), like the mod-
els of nonconscious cognition described by Hayles and Rotman, shifts 
cognition away from ‘the mental world of the participant’ and situates it, 
instead, ‘between participants, or within the system as a whole’ (Hayles 
2014, 202). Although the nonlinguistic word-relations that I will be ex-
ploring in this book are rather humble, they can nevertheless, potentially, 
18. Nevertheless, this seems an appropriate moment to note that Word does not anywhere 
address psychoanalysis, which is a domain in which nonconscious relations to words are 
exceptionally well theorized. The reasons for this are many, but they include among them 
my own lack of expertise, which I consider to be prohibitive. It bears repeating that this 
book is not intended to be an exhaustive account of either cognitive or noncognitive word-
relations (!), nor is it an attempt to ‘cover’ social theory comprehensively.
19. ‘Today the humanities stand at a crossroad. On one side the path continues with 
traditional understandings of interpretation, closely linked with assumptions about 
humans [as thinking selves, whose thought originates in the conscious/unconscious] and 
their relations to the world as represented in cultural artifacts. . . . The other path diverges 
from these assumptions by enlarging the idea of cognition to include nonconscious 
activities . . . which syncopate with conscious interpretations in a rich spectrum of 
possibilities’ (Hayles 2014, 216).
20. Just as one does not require new media—as I have already remarked—to deploy 
Deleuze and Guatarri’s machinic semiotics (which, like ‘the cognitive nonconscious,’ 
also displaces the subjectivity/consciousness/interpretation triad).
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have powerful analytic and experiential implications. They also have the 
advantage of being nimble.
Nonconscious cognition, as I have already noted, will be an important 
theme in this book. It is not my intention, however, to celebrate it as an 
end in itself, regardless of its many attractions, among which Hayles lists 
its speed, its openness to ‘the world’s capacity for infinite surprise,’ and its 
ability to displace some of the solipsistic, deluded and authoritarian conse-
quences of ‘mak[ing] [the] self the primary actor in every sense’ (Hayles 
2014, 204). I will give just three reasons here for not valorising noncon-
scious cognition per se. First, and perhaps most obviously, nonconscious 
cognition is not only not inherently desirable, it is also very often actively 
undesirable. Although Hayles concludes her analysis of the abuse of the 
temporality of automated trading algorithms in financial markets by ob-
serving that ‘not all uses of the cognitive nonconscious are exploitative or 
capitalistic in their orientations’ (Hayles 2014, 212), it remains the case that 
many of them are. Indeed, insofar as machinic capitalism (see above) is ‘a 
parasite on the feelings, movements, and becomings of bodies, tapping into 
their virtuality’ (Parisi and Goodman in Hayles 2014, 212), it is likely to be 
a ‘strange attractor’ for devices and systems that operate in the register of 
the cognitive nonconscious. ‘We term this mode of affective programming 
“mnemonic control,”’ Luciana Parisi and Steve Goodman write, ‘a deploy-
ment of power that exceeds current formulations of biopower’ (Parisi and 
Goodman in Hayles 2014, 212). 
It is also, second, worth being careful I think about claims such as this 
one—which appears in the first line of Hayles’ article—that ‘[a] massive 
shift is underway in our intellectual and cultural formations’ (Hayles 2014, 
199). As I will be rehearsing in chapter one, the foregrounding of conscious-
ness, and particularly the consciousness of ‘Man’ in relation to beliefs and 
agency (Seth 2007, 60), is the product of a specific intellectual history (what 
Sanjay Seth calls ‘modern’ and ‘Western’). One might be wary therefore of 
reinforcing the authority of this history—as if it were universal—by assert-
ing that it is coming to an end, and particularly that it is coming to an end by 
way of an opposition (between conscious and nonconscious cognition) that 
would appear to be internal to it. Herein lies the value, I think, of modest 
analyses of entities such as words which are often able to prise apart some 
of the most ‘naturalized’ relations by showing how differently they can or 
could be configured. It is in this context that my suggestion that it is possible 
to identify abiding, but altogether less high-tech, versions of nonconscious 
cognition acquires, I hope, some further significance.
Finally, and rather differently, the eventuation of these challenges—the 
challenges posed ‘not just to rationality but to consciousness in general, 
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including the experience of selfhood, the power of reason’ (Hayles 2014, 
199) and, one might add, to writing—alongside the ‘ruin’ of ‘the university’ 
(Readings 1996) should not pass unnoticed. Indeed, the timing is curiously 
reminiscent of the explosion of theories deconstructing the subject which 
neatly/nearly coincided with civil rights movements, women’s movements, 
lesbian and gay pride as well as anticolonial independence struggles. Per-
haps it is no accident that these critiques of consciousness are emerging 
at precisely the moment when intellectual life in many university systems 
is undergoing a tectonic overhaul, and when online participatory media 
platforms (such as YouTube, Facebook, Wikipedia and Twitter) are simul-
taneously offering ‘a constant stream of user-produced meanings . . . [a] 
seemingly infinite “semiotic democracy,” where anybody can say anything 
and have a chance to be heard’ (Langlois 2011, 1). It is worth being wary 
of one’s own territorial investments, especially when they are threatened. 
These three themes or issues, of words and images, language (or more 
accurately, sign machines), and nonconscious cognition, recur repeatedly, 
if differently, and more or less implicitly, throughout this book. Neverthe-
less, they are at once too broad and too specific—the potential subjects of 
books in themselves—to be the focus of what follows in Word, which does 
not seek to foreground any particular aspect or implication of nonlinguis-
tic word-world relations (see below for more on this point). It is for this 
combination of reasons that I have felt compelled to draw attention to them 
here, in the introduction. In the final two sections, I want to briefly address 
Caroline Walker Bynum’s medieval concept of wonder as it too has helped 
to shape Word, before concluding with a summary of the chapters.
WONDER: A POLITICS OF PRESENCE
In her brilliant Presidential Address, which was delivered to the Ameri-
can Historical Association annual meeting in New York in January 1997, 
Walker Bynum makes a case for wonder as a methodological tool for his-
torical analysis. Its usefulness and value, however, does not seem to me to 
be specific to medieval (or indeed any kind of) history, even though Walker 
Bynum’s understanding of this concept, being specifically medievalist, is 
somewhat counterintuitive. Wonder is relevant to Word for quite a number 
of reasons, the first of which—in the spirit of counterintuition—is that it 
skates so perilously close to everything that Word would like to avoid. 
(And, in this way, keeps the book alive to the dangers). These things 
include: an ‘enthusiasm’ for words which is ‘expropriative and appropria-
tive’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 4); a relation with words that is characterised 
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by a particular kind of stupor or admiratio—the kind that serves as a lure 
for knowledge and which, through its acquisition, leads to wonder’s ‘own 
destruction’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 5) and the use of wonder or of a world 
‘awash in wonders’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 3) as a route to reenchantment. 
The purpose of this book is not to fetishize words or to turn them into ob-
jects—like a narwhal horn or a jewel brought back from a mission (Walker 
Bynum 1997, 4)—nor is it dispel ‘ignorance,’ to act as a corrective, or to 
provide a set of rationalizations that will still a relation of wonder with 
words. As for reenchantment: this is not, for me, a compelling aspiration.
So what does wonder bring that is positive? Wonder describes a rela-
tion. This relation is defined, as Walker Bynum understands it, by three 
features: ‘it is a response to facticity; it is a response to the singular; it is 
deeply perspectival’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 13). All three of these char-
acteristics are pertinent to the analysis of words in this book. To take the 
second one first (for I have, in a sense, already addressed it): this book 
is concerned not just with the specificity of the relations that constitute 
word-assemblages, but also with the singularity that necessarily follows 
from it. For instance: it is not the aim of this book to generalize about 
words, but rather to propose that there is political, ethical, intellectual and 
emotional purpose in cultivating an attentiveness to the particularity—if 
not, on occasion, the uniqueness—of word-assemblages and their uses. It 
is on account of their singularity that word-assemblages can also be said 
to be ‘deeply perspectival’ (Walker Bynum’s third characteristic). For as 
Walker Bynum suggests, an entity cannot be wondrous without an ob-
server who believes it to be so: ‘if you do not believe the event,’ Gervais 
of Tilbury (ca.1150–ca.1228) said, then ‘you will not marvel at it’ (Walker 
Bynum 1997, 24). 
Which leaves only Walker Bynum’s first characteristic, facticity. Fac-
ticity describes, simply, a relation to something present. ‘To medieval 
thinkers,’ Walker Bynum writes, ‘human beings cannot wonder at what 
is not there’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 3). Facticity is especially important 
to Word because this book seeks, first and foremost, to address words in 
their there-ness. This is in direct contradistinction to those absences that so 
often, too often, wash over and flood them, whether this is because words 
are customarily considered effectual only when they withdraw from the 
world to which they are pointing (when they recede, that is, into pure func-
tionality), or whether it is on account of the absence that is perceived to lie 
at the heart of language (for in the modern concept of signification there 
can be no knowledge of ‘pure presence,’ only knowledge that is mediated 
by signs [Colebrook 2010, 252]). Indeed, this book not only explores the 
absences that are problematically associated with words—problematically, 
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that is, from Word’s point of view—but also the absences that are attributed 
to them. This approach to absence situates Word among that ‘bedraggled’ 
group, as Eric Leigh Schmidt puts it, that considers the zeal with which 
many critics and theorists pursue and identify absence—the ‘explana-
tory predilection to take away’—to ‘itself [be] a historical phenomenon’ 
(Schmidt 2002, 33). There will be at least three occasions in this book 
where I attend to the implications, usually political, that are perceived to 
follow from the identification of absent referents. In chapter 1, in relation to 
a cluster of academic disciplines that include Oriental studies, Area studies 
and postcolonial studies; in chapter 3, in relation to (the construction of) 
fanatical words (as well as so-called fanatical subjects) and in chapter 4, in 
relation to any unit, be it a word or a photograph, that is extracted from a 
perceived continuity (such as language, time or the weather). 
Interestingly, particularly in view of the problematic legacy of ‘self-
referentiality’ that I discuss in chapter 1, Walker Bynum considers the three 
aspects of wonder (facticity, singularity and perspectivalism) to be espe-
cially helpful in combatting ‘the danger of being trapped by the multiple 
readings of texts open to—but, we may fear, reflective only of—us after the 
linguistic turn’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 1–2). For Walker Bynum, wonder is 
not so much a philosophical answer to or rebuttal of what, writing in the late 
1990s, she calls postmodernism, but rather a useful orientation to objects of 
analysis that avoids or at least displaces some of the sense of lifelessness 
that can follow when meaning is suspended (if not absented) or always con-
sidered suspicious. Disgust, playful delight, terror, solemn astonishment, 
mischief, dread. These are just some of the emotions that Walker Bynum 
identifies as medieval ‘wonder-reactions’ (Walker Bynum 1997, 15–16). In 
its more modern manifestation, she associates wonder with strange things 
that are unheard of (Walker Bynum 1997, 25). With such strange things, 
one might say, that they point not only towards ‘the stark impossibility of 
thinking that’ (Foucault 2002, xvi), as Foucault would have it, but to the 
stark impossibility of think all that, as I would prefer to put it, and more. 
It is with strange things and stark impossibilities in mind that I turn now to 
the final section of this introduction, which briefly explains the structure of 
this book and the subjects of the chapters that follow. 
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND CHAPTER SUMMARIES
It is not words per se that is the object of chapters 1 and 2 but rather the 
 relations of words to two domains in which they are often considered—
mistakenly, I argue—to be central. These are the domains of language 
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(chapter 1), and of print and printed stories (chapter 2). As an exploration 
of changing conceptions of words (from the time of the language of Adam 
through to contemporary poststructuralist theory), chapter 1 necessarily 
raises a series of epistemological issues or, in the rather broader terms of 
this book, it examines the epistemological implications of a series of dif-
ferent word-world relations. These relations are shaped, I argue, not just by 
science and ‘modernity,’ as a post-Enlightenment narrative would have it, 
but also by histories of religions and colonial conquest which everywhere 
leave their suffocating imprint. Indeed the theoretical cul-de-sacs with 
which chapter 1 concludes seem to leave little hope for words to recover 
from what I show is their disestablishment in language. It is with a lighter 
step therefore that chapter 2 takes its cue from ‘post-poststructuralist’ at-
tention to material and sensory assemblages in order to investigate the fate 
of words in print and in printed stories. This chapter addresses in particular 
how vision and visuality, the oral and the aural, conscribe or enable what it 
is possible for words to ‘do.’ Gesture is a key theme here (especially when 
it comes to contesting the vision/oral binary) and throughout the book.
Although chapters 3, 4 and 5 are focused on particular topics, they nev-
ertheless have several dimensions and purposes. Chapter 3, for example, 
both interrogates, in some considerable detail, the implications for words 
of divine-word encounters and at the same time connects those implications 
to geo-political ‘clash of civilisations’ discourses and to the construction of 
fanatical words and subjects. In illustrating the profoundly different worlds 
that words bring with them, and how such worlds organize and reorganize 
the relations between, especially, subjects and ‘reason,’ this chapter ex-
pands and strengthens some of the critiques of the histories and theories 
of words that I began to develop in chapter 1. Similarly, in chapter 4, by 
using John Berger’s analysis of photographs to explicate what words and 
photographs might learn from each other, I extend and further develop the 
discussion of sensory word-relations that I introduced in chapter 2. One of 
the main arguments in chapter 4 is that sensory and sensual experiences of 
words do not necessarily attach themselves to corresponding sets of sense-
organs (eyes for vision, ears for hearing, etc.). Drawing on the unlikely 
combination of auto/biographies of Helen Adams Keller, who, on account 
of her deafness and blindness was accused of stealing words, and the artist 
Farniyaz Zaker, who fabricates words and puts them into motion, chapter 
4 proposes that word-relations are developed through cross- and multi-
sensory adventures. Finally, in chapter 5, all the preceding chapters, but 
especially chapters 3 and 4, are mobilized as resources in my critique of 
Brian Rotman’s Becoming Beside Ourselves, in which Rotman argues that 
the ‘return’ of gesture in parallel computing and motion capture technology 
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will ultimately lead to the end of the alphabet and all that it has instituted 
(God included). Although much of chapter 5 is dedicated to contesting 
this claim, I also draw on Rotman’s thesis—differently—to develop an 
alternative, and altogether gentler, conception of the relations between 
words, sound and gesture, particularly as it opens up a participative sonic 
methodology. This project, which proceeds by way of an analysis of Shirin 
Neshat’s video installation Turbulent (1998), returns me to Farsi, and to the 
relations between words and language. 

